( a ) The object of Faith is distinctly intelligible. Faith essentially deals with the future and with the unseen, the regions not entered by direct physical experience. The statement is perfectly general (things hoped for, objects not seen), and not specific in regard to the contents of the revelation given by God. Faith deals with everything which comes under these two categories. By Faith we attach the idea of permanence to the law which represents the results of past observation. By Faith we discern the love which is offered to our notice by outward signs.
In considering things future and unseen it will be felt that hope has a wider range than sight. Hope includes that which is internal as well as that which is external. Hence ejlpizovmena is left indefinite as extending to the whole field of mental and spiritual activity, while pravgmata ouj blepovmena suggest a definite order of objects and events outside the believer, which are conceived of as realities which may fall under man's senses. Under another aspect things hoped for are more limited than objects not seen, for the latter embrace all that belongs to the requital and purification of the guilty, and the present government of God.
( b ) In regard to the office of Faith it may be laid down that the interpretations of the two words uJpovstasi" ... e[legco" ...must be coordinate: that they must describe Faith under the same general aspect. Now, as far as the description of Faith here is concerned, it may be presented to us in regard to what it is , as a particular frame of mind, or in regard to what it does , as producing particular results. Senses have been given to uJpovstasi" and e[legco" which correspond with both views. Thus uJpovstasi" has been translated assurance, a meaning which it has in Heb. 3:14. And again essence (substance), that is, that which gives real existence to a thing, a sense closely akin to the sense in 1:3. So too e[legco" has been translated conviction, that is, the feeling of certainty, and proof, that is, the means by which certainty is gained.
The two senses of uJpovstasi" are well established; but it is difficult to suppose that e[legco" can express a state.
If then e[legco" must be understood of the proof, the test, by which the reality of the unseen is established; it seems to follow necessarily that the parallel meaning must be given to uJpovstasi" , that which gives true existence to an object.
This meaning is that which is uniformly followed by the Greek Fathers in commenting on the passage: ejpeidh; ta; ejn ejlpivdi ajnupovstata ei\nai dokei', hJ pivsti" uJpovstasin aujtoi'" carivzetai : ma'llon de; ouj carivzetai ajllj aujtov ejstin oujsiva aujtw'n : oi|on hJ ajnavstasi" ouj paragevgonen oujdev ejstin ejn uJpostavsei, ajllj hJ ejlpi;" uJfivsthsin aujth;n ejn th'/ hJmetevra/ yuch'/ (Chrys.). So theophylact: oujsivwsiv" ejsti tw'n mhvpw o[ntwn kai; uJpovstasi" tw'n mh; uJfestwvtwn ; and Theodoret: pro;" th;n tw'n ejlpizomevnwn qewrivan ojfqalmo;" hJmi'n givnetai, kai; deivknusin wJ" uJfestw'ta ta; mhdevpw gegenhmevna .
The Latin renderings also follow this interpretation without variation ( substantia ), though they present many differences in other parts of the sentence; and the Latin Fathers reproduce the ideas already quoted from the Greek Fathers.
Nor is it a valid objection that uJpovstasi" is not in this case strictly essence as applied to the several objects of hope, but (generally) that which